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Article 4

Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA
Hugh McTavish*

When drafting patent claims, inventors and their attorneys
attempt to obtain the broadest patent protection possible.
Samuel Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, claimed not just
the telegraph, but all means of communicating electronically at
1
a distance. An inventor of a new chemical discovered to have
useful properties wants to claim not just that particular
chemical, but the whole class of chemicals structurally related
to it, particularly if there is reason to believe that the other
2
chemicals in the class will have the same properties. A claim

* J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2001. B.A. Biology, Carleton
College, 1984. Ph.D. Biochemistry, University of Minnesota, 1992. I wish to
thank Dan Burk and Jan Embretson for offering comments on earlier versions
of this note.
1. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (holding that Morse’s claim for
a patent on all communication made electronically at a distance was invalid
because it was too broad).
2. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Claim two of
the patent at issue in Dillon stated that:
A composition comprising: a hydrocarbon fuel; and a sufficient amount of
at least one orthoester so as to reduce the particulate emissions from the
combustion of the hydrocarbon fuel, wherein the orthoester is of the
formula:
O—R7
R8—O—-C———-O—R6
O—R5
wherein R5, R6, R7, and R8, are the same or different monovalent organic
radical comprising 1 to about 20 carbon atoms.

Id. at 690.
This claims a very large class of chemicals. In fact, it claims almost an
infinite number of particular chemical structures. The only restriction on the
R groups is they contain 1-20 carbon atoms. They can have the carbon atoms
arranged in any way (i.e., in a straight chain or a branched chain, with
branches at different possible locations. They may or may not contain any
number of atoms of other elements, such as Cl, N, O, S, Br, H, etc., in any
possible combination. See THERALD MOELLER ET AL., CHEMISTRY: WITH
INORGANIC QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS,
CHAPTER 33 (2nd ed. 1984).
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to a single composition of matter, machine, article of
3
manufacture, or process is called a species claim. A claim to a
whole class of the above listed, for instance, one containing
multiple related species, multiple related chemicals, or multiple
4
related processes, is a genus claim or generic claim.
In determining whether an inventor is entitled to a genus
claim or merely a species claim, the courts traditionally first
determine whether the written specification, which describes
the invention and how to practice it, enables others to practice
5
the invention as broadly as it has been claimed. This is the
enablement requirement, mandated by 35 U.S.C. section 112,
6
paragraph 1. An additional requirement for patentability,

Furthermore, each R group can be different from each other. Obviously the
inventor could not have synthesized every chemical falling within this class.
However, she presumably synthesized and tested a few, and therefore had
reason to believe that any chemical containing the core structure shown, four
ester bonds to a single carbon atom, would have the recited property of
reducing particulate emissions from the combustion of hydrocarbon fuel.
3. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.04(e) (2000).
The manual states that: “[c]laims may be restricted to a single disclosed
embodiment (i.e., a single species, and thus be designated a specific species
claim), or a claim may include two or more of the disclosed embodiments
within the breadth and scope of the definition (and thus be designated a
generic or genus claim).” Id. “Species are always the specifically different
embodiments.” Id. In Dillon, if the claim had been to the orthoester of the
formula:
O—R7
R8—O———C———O—R6
O—R5
it would have been a species claim since just one chemical is being claimed.
4. See, e.g., Dillon 919 F.2d at 690 (explaining that the claim at issue
was a genus claim because it encompasses a whole class of species; in this case
a class of chemicals united by a structural feature); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112
(illustrating that Samuel Morse’s claim to all means of communicating
electronically at a distance, is a genus claim because it encompasses many
means); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.04(d) (“[A] generic
claim should include no material element additional to those recited in the
species claims, and must comprehend within its confines the organization
covered in each of the species.”). See also supra note 3 (presenting the
chemical structure of one of the species the claim in Dillon encompasses).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (explaining that if those seeking patents have sufficiently enabled
others skilled in the applicable art, then the claim is valid).
6. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
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found in 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 1, is the written
7
description requirement. In several recent recombinant DNA
cases, the Federal Circuit interpreted the written description
requirement in a way that led it to strike down generic claims,
8
notwithstanding that they were enabled. The Federal Circuit
has held that claimed DNA must be described by specification
9
of its nucleotide sequence, and that compositions of matter
(specifically DNA) can never be described by its function or
10
method of isolation, but must be described by its structure.
Interestingly enough, the second holding, though phrased
generally, has not been applied to a similar major area of
11
biotechnology patent subject matter—monoclonal antibodies.
These additional requirements make generic claims to
recombinant DNA inventions difficult, if not impossible.
This Note will argue that these additional requirements for
recombinant DNA patents should be eliminated and that the
Federal Circuit should instead return to a focus on the
enablement requirement. The Note will then describe the
enablement and written description requirements and how
these statutory requirements apply to biotechnology cases.
Finally, this Note will argue that the court’s current approach
is flawed and propose that the court’s evaluation of DNA
patents should return to an emphasis on the enablement
requirement.

and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
7. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-64 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
8. See Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-71
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993); and
Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1200-13 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
9. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567.
10. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (“[I]rrespective of the complexity or
simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like
conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance
other than by its functional utility.”).
11. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the Wands case).
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BACKGROUND

ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT

To receive a patent, an inventor must describe the
invention well enough for one skilled in the art to understand,
12
make, and use it. That requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C.
section 112, paragraph 1:
The specification [of a patent] shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
13
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

The patent specification must be sufficiently detailed to
enable others skilled in the art to practice the claimed
14
invention without “undue experimentation.” The specification
need not be so detailed as to enable a layperson to practice the
15
invention. Rather, it must enable a person skilled in the art,
which in biotechnology is a Ph.D.-level scientist, who also is
knowledgeable in the subdiscipline of the invention and skilled
16
in that subdiscipline’s routine techniques.
The other key aspect of the enablement requirement is that
it only requires that others will not have to perform “undue
experimentation” to reproduce it. Enablement is not precluded
by the necessity of some experimentation, “[t]he key word is
17
The court in In Re Wands
‘undue,’ not experimentation.”
stated a test for what would constitute “undue
experimentation”: “The test [for undue experimentation] is not
merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of
experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine or if the
specification in question provides a reasonable amount of

12. “To be enabling under § 112, a patent must contain a description that
enables one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention.” Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
14. See In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1976); PPG Industries,
Inc. v. Guardian Industries, Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that to satisfy the enabling requirement, a patent must show those
skilled in the art how to make and use the invention).
15. See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372-74 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
16. See id.
17. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504.

2001] ENABLING GENUS PATENT CLAIMS TO DNA

125

guidance with respect to the direction in which the
18
experimentation should proceed . . . .”
Enablement is generally considered to be the most
important factor for determining the scope of claim protection
19
The scope of enablement must be commensurate
allowed.
20
with the scope of the claims. However, enablement does not
require that an inventor disclose every possible embodiment of
21
his invention. Additionally, there is a policy to reward pioneer
22
inventions with broad protection.
Since a pioneer inventor
may have enabled a broad new range of inventions, courts
23
consider that the inventor should be rewarded for it.

18. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), (quoting In re
Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (BNA)).
19. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 660 (2nd ed. 1997).
20. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1212; O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62. In O’Reilly,
the inventor, Samuel Morse, had claimed “the use of . . . electromagnetism,
however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters . . . at any
distance . . .” Id. at 112. Morse had not taught how to practice or even
imagined all possible means of communicating at a distance via
electromagnetism. See id. at 112-14. He had only enabled one means—the
telegraph—others later invented other means. See id. at 68-74. See also In re
Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a means plus
function claim, claiming all means for achieving a given function, was invalid
for lack of enablement where only a single means was disclosed).
21. See Clark Blade & Razor Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 194 F. 421,
423 (3rd Cir. 1912), (quoting Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S.
286, 302 (1894)). The court stated that:
[F]or if such were the law, patentability must have been denied to
Elias Howe for the “grooved and eye-pointed needle,” . . . of which it
was said [by the Supreme Court] in Deering v. Winona, 155 U.S.
286, 15 Sup. Ct. 118, 39 L.Ed. 153: ‘The invention of a needle with
the eye near the point is the basis of all the sewing machines used,
but the methods of operating such a needle are many; and if Howe
had been obliged to make his own method a part of every claim in
which the needle was an element, his patent would have been
practically worthless.
Id. at 423.
22. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The Hogan court
expressed this policy stating that:
To restrict [a patentee] to the . . . form disclosed . . . would be a poor
way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy
against broad protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both
shortsighted and unsound from the standpoint of promoting
progress in the useful arts, the constitutional purpose of the patent
laws.
Id. at 606.
23. See id.
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The enablement requirement is stricter for “unpredictable
arts” than predictable ones. Thus, “[i]f an invention pertains to
an art where the results are predictable, . . . a broad claim can
24
Courts
be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment.”
consider, for instance, that the field of electronics is a
25
predictable art. From the invention of a single type of circuit,
courts presume that one skilled in the art may be able to create
other, similar circuits and know with a reasonable certainty
26
that they will perform predictably. In contrast, chemistry and
27
biology are often classified as unpredictable arts. Courts are
hesitant to allow a claim encompassing a broad class of
chemicals from the synthesis of one or a few chemicals of the
28
class: though one can make reasonable predictions about the
characteristics of similar chemicals, one is not entirely certain
until the new species are actually synthesized and
29
In unpredictable arts, enablement of generic
characterized.
claims is considered lacking because the undescribed
embodiments
cannot
be
made
without
undue
30
experimentation.

24. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (citing In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (CCPA 1971); In re Vickers, 141
F.2d 522, 527 (CCPA 1944)).
25. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In cases
involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a
single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once
imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their
performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws.”).
26. See id. Because of the complexity of circuits in many modern
semiconductor chips, that presumption is no longer valid. Developers often do
not know how a circuit will perform until it is tested. See Christine Gorman,
Hacking the Cell’s Circuitry, TIME, Aug. 7, 2000, at 75.
27. See e.g., Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839. See also In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730,
734 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (deciding that in lieu of labeling an entire art predictable
or unpredictable; a case by case inquiry determining whether the factors
involved in the art are predictable or not is more proper).
28. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re
Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
29. See Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24; Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1383.
30. See Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1383 (“In . . . chemical cases, where there is
unpredictability in performance of certain species or subcombinations other
than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in the art may be found not to
have been placed in possession of a genus . . . .”).
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WRITTEN DESCRIPTION

In biotechnology cases, the Federal Circuit has given
prominence to another requirement for patentability that in
other fields has rarely been invoked to invalidate patent claims:
the written description requirement. The written description
requirement, like the enablement requirement, is derived from
31
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1. It is a requirement that the
patent application provide “adequate support” for the claims at
32
issue. The standard is that an applicant must convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
33
filing date, the applicant was in possession of the invention.
The requirement most often arises in disputes over whether
claims can relate back to the specification of an earlier
34
application to gain the benefit of that earlier filing date.
The purpose of the written description requirement is to
guard “against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he
recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can
be determined to be encompassed within his original
31. See Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560-64.
32. See id. at 1560.
33. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
34. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and 132 (2000). Section 120 provides: “An
application for a patent for an invention disclosed in an application previously
filed . . ., which is filed by an inventor or inventors named in the previously
filed application, shall have the same effect as to such invention as though
filed on the date of the prior application . . . .” Section 132 addresses the
limitations on the amendment of a patent after it has been rejected. It
provides that “[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure
of the invention.” Thus, under § 132, if an inventor wishes to introduce new
claims during the consideration of her patent or the specification of the patent,
the written description of the invention, must provide “adequate support” for
the new claims. See Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560. Otherwise, she must
file a new patent, with a later filing date, wherein the invention might no
longer be patentable because of prior art arising between the two filing dates.
Likewise, under § 120, an inventor can file a new patent, but relate it back to
the filing date of an earlier application (again so as to antedate certain prior
art that arose in the meantime) if the earlier application’s written description
of its invention provides support for the claims of the new patent. See id.
In Vas-Cath, the inventor filed a utility patent for a catheter claiming a
lumen that is “substantially greater than one-half but substantially less than
a full diameter.” See id. at 1566. An earlier design application by the same
inventors for the same or similar catheter had included drawings of the
catheter, but the earlier application had said nothing about the range of
diameter for the lumen. See id. The defendants argued, and the court agreed,
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to derive the claimed
range from the earlier drawing, and so the earlier application had provided an
adequate written description to support the new claims. See id.
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35

creation.”
This formulation suggests that the written
description requirement is only relevant to determine whether
claims can relate back to an earlier specification. Another
expression of the purpose is that the requirement prevents
inventors from practicing “upon the credulity or the fears of
other persons, by pretending that his invention is more than
36
This implies that courts are concerned
what it really is.”
about deception and want proof that the inventor actually
invented what he has claimed.
C.

BIOTECHNOLOGY CASES

1.

Written Description Requirement

The Federal Circuit has used the written description
requirement to strike down the claims in a key biotechnology
37
case. In Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the
University of California (“UC”) had cloned and determined the
38
From that
nucleotide sequence of the rat insulin cDNA.
35. See Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Rengo Co., Ltd. v. Molins
Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3rd Cir.)).
36. See id. (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 434 (1822)).
37. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
38. DNA is composed of four nucleotides: A, C, G, and T. The structure of
a DNA can be defined by the sequence of these nucleotides, e.g.,
AAGTCCAGT. The term cDNA can be thought of as synonymous with gene for
our purposes. It is a stretch of DNA created by recombinant DNA techniques
that codes for one, or sometimes a few, proteins. DNA is double stranded,
with the nucleotides of one strand binding to the complementary nucleotides of
the other strand. A is complementary to T, and C is complementary to G. The
two strands of a gene are called the template strand and the non-template
strand. Thus, the sequence of the two strands of a portion of a gene would
look like this:
non-template
template

ACGTTCCAA
TGCAAGGTT

When the gene is expressed, the template strand is “read,” or used as a
template for the synthesis of a complementary strand of RNA. That process is
called transcription. The resultant RNA has the same sequence as the nontemplate strand, except that RNA uses nucleotides called uridine, or U,
instead of the thymidine, or T, of DNA. The RNA strand is called messenger
RNA, or mRNA. Thus, the template DNA and mRNA would have these
sequences:
mRNA
ACGUUCCAA
DNA template TGCAAGGTT
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discovery, UC claimed generic patents for cDNA encoding any
vertebrate insulin and cDNA encoding any mammalian
39
insulin. The court ruled those broad claims invalid for lack of
40
an adequate written description.
It reasoned that a
description of rat insulin cDNA is not a description of
41
Likewise, the court
vertebrate or mammalian cDNA.
reasoned that the mere name “mammalian insulin cDNA” is
not an adequate description because it describes the function of
42
the gene, but not the structure. It is a description of what the
43
gene does, which is encode insulin, not of what it is made. An
adequate description “requires a kind of specificity usually
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of
44
nucleotides that make up the cDNA.”
To enable generic claims, applicants “are not required to
disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an
45
unpredictable art.” However, disclosure of one species’ gene
sequence, such as rat insulin cDNA, was held not enough to
claim the gene sequence for the entire genus of mammalian

The mRNA dissociates from the DNA to become a single-stranded mRNA,
and the template DNA strand reassociates with the non-template DNA to
reform double-stranded DNA. Next the mRNA is “translated” by cellular
enzymes into a protein. That is, the sequence of nucleotides in the RNA will
determine the sequence of amino acids in the protein whose synthesis it
directs. One mRNA codes for the synthesis of one or a few proteins. A gene is
defined as a sequence of DNA that codes for one protein. So sometimes an
mRNA corresponds to one gene, sometimes to a few genes. See WILLIAM B.
WOOD, BIOCHEMISTRY: A PROBLEMS APPROACH, CHAPTERS 17, 18, 20 (2nd ed.
1981).
The DNA at issue in Eli Lilly was a complementary DNA, or cDNA. A
cDNA is synthesized from a mRNA. Enzymes are used that will copy a singlestranded mRNA into a double-stranded DNA, and the double-stranded DNA
that results is called a cDNA. The cDNA will have the same sequence as the
genomic DNA (genomic DNA is the DNA naturally present in the cell) that
was originally used in the cell to direct transcription of the mRNA, with one
difference. Genomic DNA contains sequences of varying sorts that do not
encode proteins and are not transcribed into RNA. In fact, in mammals,
including humans, the overwhelming majority of DNA is not transcribed into
RNA. Thus, a cDNA corresponds to only the DNA that is transcribed into
RNA, most of which encodes the amino acid sequences of proteins. See JAMES
DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 249-55 (1986).
39. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63.
40. See id. at 1566-69.
41. See id. at 1568.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1569.
45. Id. (quoting In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
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insulin cDNAs.
The court suggested that enumeration of
cDNAs for a plurality of species may provide an implicit
47
description of the genus.
In Eli Lilly, UC also claimed human insulin cDNA,
supported in the patent specification by a protocol for isolating
the human cDNA, which was based on the procedure used for
isolating rat insulin cDNA and the known amino acid sequence
48
of human insulin. The court said that “whether or not [this]
provides an enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written
49
description of the cDNA encoding human insulin.”
Apparently the nucleotide sequence would be required in order
50
to provide an adequate written description of the claim.
Such strict written description requirements indicate that
the enablement requirement is inadequate in recombinant
DNA inventions. Taken literally, it means that no matter how
routine it may become to clone and sequence DNA, and no
matter how complete the enablement of a recombinant DNA
invention, the DNA cannot be claimed without a specification of
its nucleotide sequence.
The Federal Circuit took the same position in one of the
51
cases cited in Eli Lilly. Fiers v. Revel involved a priority
dispute over a recombinant DNA invention. In Fiers, the court
denied priority to the party that first conceived of the
successful procedure for isolating the gene, even though it
52
found that the procedure was routine to one skilled in the art.
Instead, it awarded priority to the party that first determined
53
The court stated that
the gene’s nucleotide sequence.
“[i]rrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of
isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance
54
other than by its functional utility.” The court went on to hold
that conception of a process for making a substance, i.e. for
cloning a gene, does not constitute conception of the gene

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 1567-69.
See id. at 1569.
See id. at 1567.
See id.
See id.
984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
See id. at 1167-69.
See id. at 1172.
See id. at 1169.
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55

itself. Conception for a substance claim, i.e. to the gene itself,
requires conception of the nucleotide sequence of a gene, which
56
is the substance’s physical structure.
2. Breadth of Enablement in Recombinant DNA Cases
Two Federal Circuit cases directly addressed the scope of
enablement provided in recombinant DNA inventions. In each
case, the court concluded that the breadth of enablement
provided by the specification was too narrow for the generic
57
claims at issue. In Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,
Amgen had cloned the gene for human erythropoietin (“EPO”),
58
a hormone that stimulates red blood cell production. Claim 7
of the patent claimed all DNA sequences “encoding a
polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently
duplicative of . . . EPO to allow possession of the biological
property of causing bone marrow cells to increase production of
59
. . . red blood cells . . . .” The court ruled the claim invalid for
lack of an enabling disclosure, based on the fact that the patent
specification taught only how to prepare a few analogs of the
EPO gene, whereas it claimed any DNA encoding a protein
with EPO biological activity and an amino acid sequence
60
similar to EPO. The court ruled that the scope of enablement
61
was not as broad as the scope of the claims.

55. See id.
56. See id. The court cites Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), for this view. However, this is actually a departure
from Amgen. In Amgen, the court focused on the uncertain success of the
conceived method for isolating the gene as the reason it ruled that conception
of the gene did not occur until it was actually isolated. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at
1207. For “conception of a purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding
human EPO, . . . Fritsch’s conception of a process had to be sufficiently specific
that one skilled in the relevant art would succeed in cloning the EPO gene.”
Id. (emphasis added). That certainly implies that if success were guaranteed,
conception of a process for obtaining the gene would constitute conception of
the gene.
57. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
58. See id. at 1212.
59. Id. at 1204.
60. See id. at 1213. The court stated that the “[d]etails for preparing only
a few EPO analog genes are disclosed. This ‘disclosure’ might justify a generic
claim encompassing these and similar analogs, but it represents inadequate
support for Amgen’s desire to claim all EPO-type products.” Id.
61. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14.
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The court asserted that it is theoretically possible for a
62
genus claim to genetic sequences to be valid.
One has to
wonder about that assertion, since the Federal Circuit has
never upheld a genus claim to DNA sequences.
The second case that directly addresses scope of
enablement in recombinant DNA patents is Enzo Biochem, Inc.
63
v. Calgene, Inc., a case dealing with a patent on antisense
technology. Antisense technology is a means of controlling
gene expression by reducing the production of particular
64
In this case, Calgene used the
proteins inside a cell.
technology in its flavr savr tomato to slow the ripening process
65
in tomatoes. They used antisense to reduce the production of
66
an enzyme that promotes ripening.

62. See id. at 1214. The court reasoned that:
[We] do not intend to imply that generic claims to genetic sequences
cannot be valid where they are of a scope appropriate to the invention
disclosed by an applicant. That is not the case here, where Amgen has
claimed every possible analog of a gene containing about 4,000
nucleotides with a disclosure only of how to make EPO and a few
analogs.

Id.
In addition the court stated that:
[I]t is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of
his invention. [W]hat is necessary is that he provide a disclosure
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the invention
commensurate with the scope of his claims. For DNA sequences, that
means disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to justify grant
of the claims sought. Amgen has not done that here.

Id. at 1213.
63. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
64. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1362. The idea of antisense
technology is rather simple. In gene expression, an enzyme called RNA
polymerase copies one strand of the segment of DNA making up a gene or
group of genes, the template strand, into a complementary RNA strand. This
single stranded RNA, called a messenger RNA (mRNA) is “translated” into
protein. Enzymes in the cell “read” the single-stranded mRNA and translate
it into protein.
In antisense technology, a DNA construct is created so that the
nontemplate strand of some gene, rather than the template strand, is
transcribed into RNA. This single-stranded antisense RNA binds to the
complementary mRNA for that gene that exists naturally in the cell. This
makes the RNA double stranded instead of single stranded, so that it cannot
be read by the cellular enzymes and translated into protein. Thus, in theory
at least, that particular protein is not created as the long as the antisense
RNA is present. See id. at 1366-67.
65. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1368.
66. See id.
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Enzo had a patent that claimed antisense technology in all
organisms including bacteria, plants, animals, fungi, and
67
viruses.
The inventor only succeeded in regulating three
68
genes in one organism; the E. coli bacterium.
He failed in
69
attempts to regulate some other genes in E. coli. There were
70
no examples of success in any other organisms. Despite these
failures, the claims were drawn very broadly.
In evaluating whether the disclosure enabled the generic
claims, the court considered the list of factors set forth in In re
Wands:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working
examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art,
(6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
71
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.

The issue for the court was whether these broad generic
claims were enabled by the disclosure. The court found that:
the claims were extraordinarily broad, covering an infinite
72
number of cell types; antisense technology was highly
73
unpredictable; the quantity of experimentation necessary to
adapt the technology to plants or to any species other than E.
74
coli was quite high; and that the amount of direction and
number of examples provided in the specification were very
75
narrow compared to the breadth of the claims.
The court invalidated the claims, holding that the breadth
of enablement was not commensurate with the breadth of the
76
claims. It did, however, leave the door open for generic claims
in biotechnology, stating:
It is well settled that patent applicants are not required to
disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an
unpredictable art.
However, there must be sufficient
disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology,
to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and use the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
1998)).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 1367-68.
See id. at 1372-73.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1371 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir.
See id. at 1372.
See id.
See id. at 1372-73.
See id. at 1374-75.
See id. at 1372-75.
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77

invention as broadly as it is claimed.
The court also said that with advances in science, what
was unpredictable at one time may become predictable and, at
that time, broader generic claims are more likely to be
78
allowed.
79
A third recombinant DNA case, In re Bell, was decided
based on whether the prior art made the claimed invention
obvious. The court’s analysis also sheds some light on the
enablement requirement. An obviousness inquiry has two
parts: first, whether the prior art suggests the claimed
invention, and second, whether the prior art demonstrates a
reasonable expectation of success in attempting to practice the
80
The second part of the inquiry asks
claimed invention.
whether the prior art enables one skilled in the art to practice
the invention. In Bell, the inventors claimed the genes for
81
The complete
human insulin-like growth factors I and II.
amino acid sequences of both proteins were already known
82
from the prior art. The question for the court was whether
this and the prior art in recombinant DNA cloning made the
83
genes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. The court
first considered whether the method used to select the clone,
hybridization with degenerate oligonucleotide primers, would
84
have been obvious to one skilled in the art. The court found it
would not—a finding that is clearly in error. The method of
using degenerate oligonucleotide primers to select DNA clones
was in the prior art. That method was, at the time, and, still is
today, the preferred method to select a gene based on
knowledge of the full or partial amino acid sequence of the
85
protein it encodes and would have been the obvious method to
try.

77. Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 & n.23 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
78. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1374 n.10.
79. 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
80. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Anita
Varma and David Abraham, DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness and the
Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 81
(1996). See also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2142 (2000).
81. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
82. See id. at 783.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 784-85.
85. See Varma and Abraham, supra note 80, at 61-62 and 82.
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Whether the method, at that time, would have had a
reasonable expectation of success is a closer question, which the
court did not reach. Today, success would be nearly assured
86
without undue experimentation. At the time of Bell, in 1981,
the method was new, and perhaps, a person of ordinary skill in
87
the art would not have felt so certain that it would succeed. If
we assume, though, that there was a reasonable expectation of
success in cloning the gene, then from an enablement
standpoint, the prior art made the invention of the cloned gene
obvious. We could say that the prior art enabled one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention.
The court did not find the genes obvious for the following
reasons. First, because it wrongly concluded that the method
88
to isolate the genes was not obvious. Second, regardless of the
obviousness of the method, “the issue is the obviousness of the
89
compositions, not of the method by which they are made.”
Because of the degeneracy of the genetic code, the court
36
asserted that 10 nucleotide sequences could encode the known
amino acid sequence, and thus, the structure of the gene was
90
not obvious. If the focus instead had been on the obviousness
of the method used to isolate the gene, along with a reasonable
expectation of success (in other words, whether or not the prior
art enabled the practice of the invention) the genes should have
been ruled obvious.
91
The Federal Circuit declined to consider, in Eli Lilly,
whether the claims at issue were enabled, but it is useful for
the purposes of this note to determine whether they were. The
University of California researchers had discovered and cloned
92
the nucleotide sequence of the rat insulin cDNA. From this,
they generically claimed vertebrate and, more narrowly,
mammalian insulin cDNAs, as well as specifically human

86. Even the author was able to use the procedure to clone a gene. See H.
McTavish et al., Sequence of the Gene Coding for Ammonia Monooxygenase
from Nitrosomonas europaea, 175 J. BACTERIOL. 2436 (1993).
87. See Varma and Abraham, supra note 80, at 61-62 (arguing that the
procedures made reasonably certain, even at the time the experiments were
initiated in Bell).
88. See Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
89. Id. at 785.
90. See id. at 784.
91. Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
92. See id. at 1562-63.
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insulin cDNA, which they had not yet cloned.
Their
specification described methods to isolate these cDNAs by
94
reference to the method used to isolate the rat insulin cDNA.
First, one would make a cDNA library from the appropriate
95
tissue of the organism—the islet cells of the pancreas. Then
96
one would screen the library with the rat insulin cDNA. The
creation of cDNA libraries was fairly new but becoming routine
97
in the art by the time of the UC application in 1977.
Screening that library with the cloned cDNA from a
homologous gene was also routine and would be virtually
98
certain to succeed. Proteins performing the same function in
any two species of mammals are certain to have very similar
99
amino acid sequences. Likewise, the genes for those proteins
are certain to be homologous. It follows that there was at least
a reasonable expectation that the screening of mammallian
cDNA libraries with rat insulin cDNA would succeed in
isolating the insulin cDNA from any desired mammallian
species, including humans. Even though UC only knew the
sequence of rat insulin cDNA, its specification of that invention
enabled anyone skilled in the art to isolate any other
mammallian insulin cDNA. The procedure, while lengthy and
100
Thus, the
time consuming, all but assured success.
93. See id.
94. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,652,525, W.J. Rutter et al., Recombinant Bacterial
Plasmids Containing the Coding Sequences of Insulin Genes.
95. See id.
96. See id. See also U.S. Pat. No. 4,431,740, G. Bell et al., DNA Transfer
Vector and Transformed Microorganism Containing Human Proinsulin and
Pre-Proinsulin Genes.
97. See T. Maniatis et al., Amplification and Characterization of a -Globin
Gene Synthesized in Vitro, 8 CELL 163 (1976).
98. See W. David Benton & Ronald W. Davis, Screening gt Recombinant
Clones by Hybridization to Single Plaques in situ, 196 SCIENCE 180-81 (1977)
(describing both the process and accuracy of the screening methods.)
99. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CREIGHTON, PROTIENS: STRUCTURES AND
MOLECULAR PROPERTIES, Ch. 3 (2nd ed. 1993). The same protein in closely
related species, such as insulin in rats and humans, usually differs by
relatively few amino acids. For instance, the human hemoglobin -chain differs
in amino acid sequence from the analogous protein in Rhesus monkey by 3%
and from cow by 12%. Additionally, these differences in amino acid sequence
occur in regions of the protein that do not play an essential role in its function.
100. After obtaining a rat cDNA, the UC researchers required two years to
clone the human cDNA. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63. Today this
task would not take as long.
The obvious counterargument would suggest that the disclosure was not
enabling of the human cDNA because cloning the human gene would require
undue experimentation. A finding of undue experimentation could be
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specification enabled the generic claims.
However, the court never reached that question, disposing
of the case instead on its rule that a written description of a
claimed gene must include its specific nucleotide sequence.
Thus, these generic claims were disallowed. The focus on both
the written description requirement and structure meant that
otherwise enabled claims were invalid.
3. Enablement in a Monoclonal Antibody Case
The Federal Circuit’s holdings regarding another major
area of biotechnology have differed from its holdings regarding
recombinant DNA patents. The court has allowed monoclonal
101
antibodies, unlike genes or DNA molecules, to be described by
their function and conceived by their method of isolation
102
the
without structural description.
In In re Wands,
supported by the length and recent development of the procedure. At the time
the UC patent at issue in Eli Lilly was filed, the procedures used to clone both
the rat and human insulin genes were relatively new and researchers did not
have a great deal of experience with the techniques. See id. On that basis,
perhaps one could argue that someone who attempted to clone the human
insulin gene using the patent disclosing the rat gene would not have been
certain of success. The certainty of success had not yet been established.
Nonetheless, we know that the method disclosed in the patent would have led
to successfully cloning the human gene. UC, in fact, did enable the cloning of
the human gene. Furthermore, the methods of creating a cDNA library and
screening it for a particular clone have not changed a great deal since the UC
patent application. Compare Maniatis, supra note 97, at 163 (“develop[ing] a
method for gene purification and amplification which could be applied to
any . . . gene whose mRNA could be obtained.”), with T. MANIATIS, E.F.
FRITSCH, AND J. SAMBROOK, MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL
(1982), and T. MANIATIS, E.F. FRITSCH, AND J. SAMBROOK, MOLECULAR
CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL (2nd ed. 1989) (describing essentially the
same cloning techniques, respectively, six and thirteen years later).
101. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733-34 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (providing an
insightful general description of monoclonal antibodies). Antibodies are a
class of proteins that help defend the body against invaders. Antibodies bind
tightly to other molecules, present on the invaders, called antigens. The
tightness of the antibody-antigen binding is called affinity. Each antibody
binds to just one antigen, and in fact to just one part of the antigen molecule,
called a determinant. In an immune response, many different antibodies —
that is, proteins with different amino acid sequences — binding to the same
antigen are produced. Different antibodies binding to the same determinant
on the antigen are even produced. From this diversity of antibodies binding to
a single antigen, scientists can select one of these antibodies and make large
amounts of it. These identical antibodies produced from a single cell type are
called monoclonal antibodies. See also BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, 181-84, 951-1012 (1983).
102. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 734.
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appellants claimed an immunoassay method for detecting
hepatitis-B surface antigen using any IgM monoclonal antibody
9
with a binding affinity constant of greater than 10
103
moles/liter.
The issue before the court was whether the
104
disclosure enabled this broad claim.
The inventors disclosed
a method for isolating IgM monoclonal antibodies meeting
105
This disclosure of a
those binding affinity specifications.
procedure to isolate a monoclonal antibody sufficiently satisfied
the enablement requirement, because it was routinely used by
those skilled in the art and, more importantly, it had a high
rate of success in producing monoclonal antibodies fitting the
106
Thus, the disclosure did not require undue
claims.
107
experimentation.
This ruling came despite the fact that the
method was lengthy and was difficult enough that even the
108
inventors had trouble in their first few attempts.
Interestingly, each time a scientist isolated monoclonal
antibodies to produce this invention, he would isolate a
109
Although the antibody
different monoclonal antibody.
isolated would have the same functional characteristic —
binding hepatitis B surface antigen with high affinity — it
110
By the logic of
would have a different amino acid sequence.
Eli Lilly and Fiers, each isolation would be a different
invention.
The court here, unlike in the DNA cases, focused on
111
It did not address the issue,
enablement, not structure.
perhaps because it was not raised, of whether the amino acid
sequence of the monoclonal antibody used was not specified.
Nor was the court bothered (again perhaps because the
argument was not raised) by the fact that anyone attempting to
practice this invention would isolate a monoclonal antibody
with a different amino acid sequence.

103. See id. at 734-35. Antibodies can be used for sensitive diagnostic tests
called immunoassays that detect the presence of the antigen to which an
antibody binds, such as hepatitis-B surface antigen.
104. See id. at 735.
105. See id. at 736.
106. See id. at 739-40.
107. See id. at 740.
108. See id.
109. See T.D. BROCK & M.T. MADIGAN, BIOLOGY OF MICROORGANISMS 43746 (6th ed. 1991).
110. See id.
111. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 735-40.
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D. AN ECONOMIC ARGUMENT AGAINST GENUS PATENTS
The Federal Circuit seems to have erected special barriers
to generic or broad claims in biotechnology, particularly in
recombinant DNA. Presumably, the court is concerned with
allowing broad areas of a new field of technology to be blocked
from competition. An economic basis for those concerns was
112
articulated by Robert Merges and Richard Nelson.
A broad patent can give the patent holder rights not just
over the invention, but also over some improvements on the
113
invention when those improvements are considered obvious.
114
Merges and Nelson argue that this is economically inefficient.
When a single rightholder controls the rights to future
improvements on a current technology, it can be expected that
115
The
the rightholder will underdevelop the improvements.
single entity will have less imagination and take a less wideranging approach to exploring possible improvements than
116
Second, when a firm has rights to the
would multiple actors.
improvements, it will move more slowly in developing the
improvements, because it need not fear that others will develop
117
them first and obtain a monopoly over the improvements.
The ultimate concern here is not the firm, but rather, the
possible lack of incentive to improve technology in the field.
E. BLOCKING PATENTS
When broad patent claims are awarded, as this note
advocates, it intrinsically increases the possibility of
nonobvious improvements falling within the scope of the
claims. Blocking patents arise when an inventor claims a
nonobvious patentable improvement that literally infringes an
118
An example of how this can arise is when a
earlier patent.
112. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing that the breadth of a
patent influences its economic significance).
113. See id. at 845-49.
114. See id. at 844. In many industries the efficiency gains from the
pioneer’s ability to coordinate are likely to be outweighed by the loss of
competition for improvements to the basic invention. See id.
115. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 112, at 873-74.
116. See id. at 873-75.
117. See id. at 872.
118. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 697-701. Blocking patents arise
because of point in time at which enablement is judged. Enablement is judged
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new use is found for a pre-existing, patented compound.
Minoxidil, for instance, was a patented compound, with its
119
known usefulness being as a drug for relieving hypertension.
When it was discovered that it was also useful for treating
baldness, those who discovered the new use obtained a patent
120
However,
for a method of treating baldness with Minoxidil.
practicing that invention would infringe the earlier composition
121
The later
of matter patent claim to the compound Minoxidil.
patent is a subservient patent. The subservient patent cannot
be practiced without a license from the holder of the dominant
patent. Likewise, the holder of the dominant patent cannot
infringe the subservient patent without a license. Thus, each
patent effectively blocks the other. The holder of the patent on

as of the time of filing. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865
F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989). An inventor can claim material that later
turns out to be beyond her research, as long as the disclosure enables others to
make use the claimed invention as it was understood at the time of filing. See
id. at 1251. An example is a claim of Phillips Petroleum Co. to crystalline
polypropylene. See id. Phillips, at the time of the patent application, had only
synthesized low molecular weight crystalline polypropylenes. See id. at 124950. However, the essence of Phillips’ invention was crystyllinity, and at the
time of filing they enabled making the only known crystalline polypropylenes.
See id. at 1249. That Phillips did not enable the production of higher
molecular weight polypropylene was irrelevant to the validity of the claim,
because “[a] patent applicant is not . . . required, however, to predict every
possible variation, improvement, or commercial embodiment of his invention.”
Id. at 1250 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 673 F.Supp.
1278, 1292 (D. Del. 1987)). The court further stated that:
Defendants’ misdirected approach here is the same as that improperly
relied upon by the PTO in Hogan. Defendants do not, as they cannot,
argue that the 1953 specification fails to enable one skilled in the art to
practice the claimed invention. That the [Phillips] claim may cover a
later version of the claimed composition (crystalline polypropylene with
higher intrinsic viscosity and average molecular weight) relates to
infringement, not patentability. To hold differently would “impose an
impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system.”

Id. at 1251-52 (citations omitted).
Because enablement is evaluated at the time of filing, a later
improvement invention can be non-obvious over the previous patent, and thus
patentable, yet infringe the previous patent.
119. See generally U.S. Pat. No. 4,871,839, W.T. Gibson, Skin Treatment
Composition.
120. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,139,619, C.A. Chidsey III, 6-Amino-4-(substituted
amino)-1,2-dihydro-1-hydroxy-2-iminopyrimidine, Topical Compositions and
Process for Hair Growth.
121. A patent claim to a composition of matter conveys the exclusive right
to make, use, or sell the composition for any purpose. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
It is irrelevant that the purpose in this case is one that was unknown at the
time the composition of matter was claimed.
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a method of treating baldness cannot practice his invention at
all without a license from the holder of the patent claiming
Minoxidil as a composition. Likewise, the holder of the
composition patent cannot use it to treat baldness without a
license from the holder of the patent claiming a method to treat
122
baldness.
II. ANALYSIS
With respect to recombinant DNA patents, the Federal
Circuit has generally focused on rules that, taken literally,
would make generic claims to more than one specific DNA
impossible. First, it has created a written description rule that
123
Second,
DNA must be described by its nucleotide sequence.
in what is really the rationale of the previous rule, it has ruled
that DNA, and any claimed composition of matter, can only be
124
It has held that
described by its structure, not its function.
genes and DNA cannot be conceived by their functional utility,
125
i.e., what proteins they encode, nor by the method for
126
isolating them,
but only by their structure (nucleotide
sequence).
Amgen shows how these rules for recombinant DNA
patents thwart genus claims in that field. In Amgen, the
inventors, after having cloned and sequenced the gene for
erythropoietin, attempted to claim DNA sequences encoding
122. See Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886). When one patent is
an improvement on another “neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the
invention of the other without the other’s consent.” Id. See also MERGES,
supra note 19, at 697-701.
123. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A] cDNA
. . . requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of
the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA.”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 117071 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An adequate description of a DNA requires more than a
mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself.”).
124. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568 (“A definition by function, as we
have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is
only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is.”).
125. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (“[C]onception of a DNA, like conception of
any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by
its functional utility.”).
126. See id. (“[C]onception only of a process for making a substance . . . can
at most constitute a conception of a substance claimed as a process.
Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process
requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or
physical properties.”).
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proteins homologous to and having the same function as
127
erythropoietin.
It was the prototypical recombinant DNA
generic claim, claiming not just one nucleotide sequence, but
also the other nucleotide sequences that would encode the same
protein or closely related proteins that function in the same
way. These variant nucleotide sequences encoding the same
protein would be obvious not just to one of skill in the art, but
arguably to anyone familiar with the degeneracy of the genetic
128
The inventors in Amgen tried to claim not just the
code.
composition of matter they had actually discovered or invented,
but also other compositions that are closely related to the
discovered species, that are obvious from knowledge of the
species, and that are expected to function the same as the
129
However, under the rules the Federal Circuit has
species.
created for recombinant DNA inventions, it is impossible to
claim related species of DNA until their sequences have been
130
The sequences could not be claimed by their
determined.
127. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmuceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 120304 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
128. See generally BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE
CELL, 199-232 (1983) (outlining DNA structure, synthesis, and replication).
The structure of any DNA molecule can be specified by the sequence of the
four nucleotides within it. A typical recombinant DNA molecule is composed
of a few thousand nucleotides. Each set of three nucleotides in the coding
region of a gene is known as a codon and specifies one amino acid in a protein,
as indicated below.
DNA: GCC-TAC-CCT-ACT
amino acids for which it codes:Ala-Tyr-Pro-Thr
Proteins are polymers of 20 different types of amino acids. Thus, when
one knows the nucleotide sequence of a cDNA, one knows the amino acid
sequence of the protein it encodes. But the converse is not true. Most amino
acids are specified by more than one codon. For instance, GCT, GCC, GCG,
and GCA all code for the amino acid alanine, designated above by its three
letter abreviation Ala. The fact that more than one codon encodes the same
amino acid is called the degeneracy of the genetic code. Because of the
degeneracy of the genetic code, it would be obvious to one skilled in the art
that one could circumvent a claim to a single nucleotide sequence by altering
the nucleotide sequence in such a way that the DNA would still encode the
same amino acid sequence. A variant nucleotide sequence encoding the same
amino acid sequence would be expected to function the same in the invention.
Likewise, even if the claims were limited to DNAs encoding a single amino
acid sequence, it would be obvious to one skilled in the art how to circumvent
the claims. One could alter the nucleotide sequence so that one or a few amino
acids in the encoded protein were changed, because a small number of amino
acid changes are usually tolerated biologically. Usually the resultant protein’s
utility would be unchanged. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text
(providing a more general description of DNA structure and sequencing).
129. See CREIGHTON, supra note 99.
130. See supra notes 44, 49, 54-56 and accompanying text.

2001] ENABLING GENUS PATENT CLAIMS TO DNA

143

131

function.
The court also emphasized the large number of
possible nucleotide sequences encoding a protein with an amino
132
The court implied
acid sequence closely homologous to EPO.
that Amgen also would not have been allowed to claim the
genus structurally — for instance, the class of nucleotide
sequences encoding an amino acid sequence 95% or more
identical to the amino acid sequence of EPO — because there
133
It seems, under the
are too many members of that class.
rules of the Federal Circuit, there is no way to claim a genus of
DNA.
The requirements created for recombinant DNA patents
have the effect of being an a priori ban on generic claims. There
is no reason generic claims to this area of technology should be
a priori precluded, especially when generic claims have been
134
permitted in related areas, such as chemistry and monoclonal
135
antibodies.
To avoid this illogical result, the court should
return to a focus on enablement in determining whether
generic claims are justified, as it does in other chemical cases
and as it has done in the recent recombinant DNA case Enzo
136
Biochem, Inc.
If the specification enables the invention to be
practiced as broadly as it is claimed, those claims should be
allowed.
They should not be thwarted by erecting a
requirement that description of a claimed DNA requires
specification of its nucleotide sequence, or that a composition of
matter can never be claimed by its function (encoding a
particular protein, in the case of a gene) or the process for its
isolation.
Why has the Federal Circuit erected special barriers to
genus or broad claims in recombinant DNA? The court has
never articulated a reason for what seems to be special
treatment given this field, but some speculation is possible.
The court is probably concerned that it would stifle innovation
in a new field if it allowed broad patents to block off
131. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1212-14 (encoding a protein that behaves
like EPO is an insufficient patent specification).
132. See id. (describing that after five years of testing, the inventor still
could not identify precisely which of more than fifty analogs had the biological
properties of EPO).
133. See id. at 1213-14. (The court notes that over a million analogs with
changes in only 3 amino acids could be made, and “Amgen has told how to
make and use only a few of them.”).
134. See supra notes 2, 4 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
136. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

144

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 2:121

competition. Broad patents deter further innovation within
137
their scope.
First, others have less incentive to develop
improvements knowing their improvements will be subject to a
138
Second, the rights holder has less incentive
blocking patent.
to develop improvements, knowing that it will retain a blocking
139
patent even if another develops them first.
However, while broad patent rights should hinder future
innovation within the scope of that patent, a refusal to grant
justified patent rights should also deter innovation. Others will
not develop technologies at all if they cannot get a return on
their investment, and sometimes the only way to get a return is
to be awarded patent rights commensurate with what they
have developed. If courts simply refuse to enforce broad patent
rights, the incentives have been diminished for developing the
significant, pioneer inventions that merit broad patent
protection.
Second, concern that a broad patent will block the
incentive to develop improvements is partially addressed by the
140
If
option of improvement patents or subservient patents.
improvements are obvious, there is no need for concern,
because the rightsholder would see them and would have the
incentive to develop them. If an improvement is not obvious,
then it is not true that the rightsholder holds complete rights to
it. The inventor of a nonobvious improvement covered by a
broader patent is entitled to a subservient or improvement
141
If the invention falls within the claims of the
patent.
dominant patent, she cannot practice it without a license from
142
But neither can the
the dominant patent rightsholder.
dominant patent rightsholder practice the improvement
143
without a license from the improvement patent holder.
Ordinarily, one would expect the two parties to reach an
economically beneficial agreement, so that the improvement
144
patent holder will receive some return for her contribution.
Third, even if it is accepted that it would be economically
wise to disallow broad patent claims in general because of their

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 118-22.
See id.
See id.
See MERGES, supra note 19, at 945-47.
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effect of stifling further innovation in the field, that policy
should apply uniformly to all fields of technology, not just to
recombinant DNA claims. There is no apparent reason why
broad patent rights are more economically deleterious in
recombinant DNA than in chemistry or other fields. With the
written description requirement of a specific nucleotide
sequence, it appears that unique barriers have been set up
against generic claims to DNAs. Returning the focus to
enablement would put DNA claims on the same footing as other
claims.
Despite the possible effect of deterring innovation within
the scope of a genus patent once the patent has been granted,
genus patents in biotechnology should be granted and
evaluated under the same standards as genus patents in other
fields. This means they should be evaluated on the basis of
enablement. The issues in an enablement inquiry are whether
the scope of enablement matches the scope of the claims, and
whether the invention can be practiced as broadly as it is
145
The additional
claimed without undue experimentation.
requirements the Federal Circuit has erected that seem
designed specifically to deter broad claims to DNAs — that a
composition of matter cannot be claimed by its function or
method of isolation, and that the nucleotide sequence of any
claimed DNA must be specified — should be dropped.
Some of the reasons for focusing exclusively on enablement
in determining the breadth of claims allowed in recombinant
DNA inventions are that it: (1) would create consistency with
precedent on simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice; (2) would create consistency with precedent in
chemistry and monoclonal antibody claims; (3) would fulfill the
purposes of the written description requirement and the
general rule that compositions of matter should be described by
structure; (4) is essential to avoiding easy circumvention of
recombinant DNA patents; (5) allows for sensible assigning of
inventorship; (6) would promote early disclosure; (6) would
avoid economic waste; and (7) would be a rule that would not be
made obsolete by advances in technology, as the current rules
have been.

145. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
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CREATING CONSISTENCY WITH PRECEDENT ON
SIMULTANEOUS CONCEPTION AND REDUCTION TO
PRACTICE

The written description requirement that DNAs can only
be described by their complete nucleotide sequence creates a
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice
146
This leads to inconsistencies with the
for DNA inventions.
prior jurisprudence on simultaneous conception and reduction
to practice. Reduction to practice occurs when an inventor has
produced the actual working invention. It occurs when “the
147
embodiment . . . actually work[s] for its intended purpose.”
Conception occurs when the inventor has completed “the
148
In the past, courts have
mental part of the inventive art.”
held that “conception is complete when one of ordinary skill in
the art could reduce the invention to practice without undue
149
This is the exact language of the
experimentation.”
150
enablement test.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”), the
predecessor to the Federal Circuit, explained the requirement
for invoking simultaneous conception and reduction to practice
in stronger terms in 1974. It stated that the doctrine applied
“only in cases where conception is followed by extensive
research characterized by perplexing and intricate difficulties
151
arising every step of the way.” The doctrine was applied only
152
once between 1974 and 1988.
Now, however, the written description requirement for a
nucleotide sequence in DNA inventions has created a situation
where the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice applies automatically to all claims for recombinant
DNAs. In fact, under this requirement conception is held not to
occur until after reduction to practice. Suppose one claims a
cDNA clone that produces insulin. That invention is reduced to

146. See John M. Lucas, The Doctrine of Simultaneous Conception and
Reduction to Practice in Biotechnology: A Double Standard for the Double
Helix, 26 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 381, 402-03 (1998).
147. Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
148. Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (citing
Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897)).
149. Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276.
150. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
151. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
152. See Lucas, supra note 146, at 397 n.113 (citation omitted).
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practice when it is cloned and the inventor has determined that
the bacterium containing the cloned DNA is producing insulin.
Yet at that point, the inventor may not know the nucleotide
sequence of the clone. He has already reduced the invention to
practice but still, under the written description rule, cannot
patent it and therefore has not conceived it. Consistency with
the precedent of conception and reduction to practice requires
that conception be held to occur when an inventor can enable
one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention, or to
isolate and create the claimed recombinant DNA. In many
cases, that occurs long before the DNA sequence is determined.
B.

CONSISTENCY WITH MONOCLONAL ANTIBODY AND CHEMICAL
CASES

DNA molecules and antibodies have very close parallels
that should lead to similar treatment under patent law, but the
Federal Circuit has treated them differently. The function of a
gene is to encode a protein — to direct production of that
protein and specify the amino acid sequence of the protein.
Because of the redundancy of the genetic code, many possible
nucleotide sequences can encode the same amino acid
153
Thus, many genes could encode the same protein.
sequence.
But from a functional standpoint, the only thing we are
interested in is what protein a gene encodes. Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly and Fiers has held that for the
purpose of obtaining patent protection for a gene, the claims
cannot recite the gene’s function — which protein it encodes —
and that conception of the gene is not complete with
154
Conception
development of a method for isolating the gene.
and description of the gene is satisfied only by the gene’s
155
nucleotide sequence.
156
The rule is the opposite for monoclonal antibodies.
The
153. See supra text accompanying note 128. The amino acid sequence of a
protein gives one considerable information about the nucleotide sequence of
the cDNA encoding it, but it does not completely determine that nucleotide
sequence.
154. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
155. See id.
156. Antibodies are a class of proteins that help defend the body against
invaders. Antibodies bind tightly to other molecules, present on the invaders,
called antigens. See Alberts, supra note 128, at 34. The tightness of the
antibody-antigen binding is called affinity. See id. at 970. Each antibody
binds to just one antigen, and in fact to just one part of the antigen molecule,
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function of antibodies is to bind to particular substances called
157
antigens.
The only reason we are interested in genes is
because of what they do: encode proteins; and the only reason
we are interested in antibodies is because of what they do: bind
antigens. If two genes encode the same protein (the same
amino acid sequence) and direct production of the same amount
of that protein, then they are identical for virtually any
158
Likewise, if two monoclonal antibodies bind the
purpose.
same determinant on the same antigen and bind it equally
tightly, then they are identical for virtually any purpose. As
with genes, many monoclonal antibodies could perform the
same function — binding the same determinant with the same
affinity.
This is so because these functionally identical
monoclonal antibodies (as with functionally identical genes,
encoding the same amino acid sequence) could have different
159
structures — different amino acid sequences.
Despite these virtually exact parallels between monoclonal
antibodies and genes, the Federal Circuit has allowed
monoclonal antibodies to be described by their function and
conceived by their method of isolation, without any structural
160
description.
Dropping the rules that description of a DNA invention
requires specification of its nucleotide sequence, and that
compositions of matter can never be claimed by their function
or method of isolation, and returning the focus to enablement
would restore consistency of the DNA cases with monoclonal
antibody cases.
As discussed above, the relevant
characteristics of monoclonal antibodies and DNA sequences
called a determinant. See id. at 972. In an immune response, many different
antibodies — that is, proteins with different amino acid sequences — binding
to the same antigen are produced. See id. at 183. Different antibodies binding
to the same determinant on the antigen are even produced. See id. From this
diversity of antibodies binding to a single antigen, scientists can select one of
these antibodies and make large amounts of it. See id. These identical
antibodies are called monoclonal antibodies because they come from a single
clone of cells. See id. A good explanation of monoclonal antibodies is found in
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733-34 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
157. See supra note 101.
158. See id.
159. See BROCK & MADIGAN, supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
160. See generally Wands, 858 F.2d at 731 (reversing the rejection of an
inventor’s claims for lack of enablement where the monoclonal antibodies
needed to make and use the invention (immunoassays) could be made from
readily available materials using methods well known in the monoclonal
antibody art – the mere availability of such monoclonal antibodies satisfied
the enablement requirement).
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are exactly parallel. The only reason we are interested in
either is because of their function — binding antigens
(monoclonal antibodies) or encoding proteins (DNAs) — not
their inherent structure. For either, a tiny change in structure
could drastically change its function. A single amino acid
change in an antibody could entirely eliminate its binding to
161
the same antigen; a single nucleotide change in a gene could
162
entirely eliminate its ability to encode any protein.
Conversely, for either, numerous structures could perform the
same function. Many different antibodies could bind the same
antigen or even the same determinant with equal affinity;
many different nucleotide sequences could encode the same
163
protein. Yet the Federal Circuit has allowed antibodies to be
164
described and claimed by their function but not DNAs.
This
inconsistency should be eliminated.
Courts addressing
recombinant DNA inventions should ask whether the
specification enables the claims as broadly as they are drawn,
not whether the sequence is specified.
Consistency with precedent in chemical patents also
demands that genus claims to recombinant DNAs be
165
obtainable. As the Federal Circuit emphasized in Amgen,
there are a large number of possible nucleotide sequences
encoding the same or very similar proteins. The court implied
that this alone justified denying claim to all the sequences

161. See ALBERTS, supra note 128, at 976 (describing that only 5-10 amino
acid residues on each polypeptide chain of an antibody make contact with the
antigen). If one of those key residues is changed, antigen-antibody binding
could be eliminated. Certain single amino acid changes in other parts of the
polypeptide could totally change the conformation of the antibody polypeptide
at the binding site, so that the antibody no longer recognizes antigen.
162. The easiest way for this to happen is that a single nucleotide change
could change a codon encoding an amino acid to a stop codon, signaling that
synthesis of the polypeptide is to stop. See supra note 92. TGA, TAA, and
TAG are stop codons, signaling termination of polypeptide synthesis.
163. See supra note 92.
164. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 731; Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1559; Fiers,
984 at 1164.
165. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
“The district court found that over 3,600 different EPO
[erythropoietin] analogs can be made by substituting at only a single amino
acid position, and over a million different analogs can be made by substituting
three amino acids. The patent indicates that it embraces means for
preparation of ‘numerous’ polypeptide analogs of EPO. Thus, the number of
claimed DNA sequences that can produce an EPO-like product is potentially
enormous.” Id. at 1213.
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encoding erythropoietin.
But the large number of possible
nucleotide sequences encoding the same protein is not
particularly relevant to whether or not a genus claim is
justified. There are a large number of variants on a specific
chemical compound, but courts allow generic claims to a family
of compounds when the related compounds have the same
properties as the original species and are obvious variants of
167
Often, claims encompassing a nearly infinite number of
it.
compounds are allowed. The Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure states that the Examiner must come forward with
an affirmative reason to reject a claim on grounds of a lack of
168
In the case of recombinant DNAs, there is little
utility.
reason to doubt that sequences encoding the same or very
similar amino acid sequences would have similar utility. There
appears no reason to have, in effect, an a priori ban on genus
claims to recombinant DNAs when such claims are allowed for
other chemicals.
C.

FULFILLING THE PURPOSES OF THE GENERAL RULE THAT
COMPOSITIONS OF MATTER SHOULD BE DESCRIBED BY
STRUCTURE

Valid reasons exist for the general requirement that, for
claims to chemical compounds, the compounds must recite their
structures. Those reasons do not apply, however, to genes and
proteins. The purposes of the requirement can be better
satisfied by claiming genes and proteins by function.
The first purpose of requiring a description of the common
structural features of a class in genus claims to chemical
166. See id. at 1213-14. The court stated:
Details for preparing only a few EPO analog genes are disclosed. . . .
This ‘disclosure’ might well justify a generic claim encompassing these
and similar analogs, but it represents inadequate support for Amgen’s
desire to claim all EPO gene analogs. There may be many other genetic
sequences that code for EPO-type products. Amgen has told how to
make and use only a few of them.

Id. at 1213-14.
167. See generally In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A prior generic
patent had claimed developer compositions comprised of the esterification
product of any chemicals from two generic families — dicarbaxylic acids and
phenols. The issue was whether Baird’s patent for a product involving a
particular species of phenol was obvious in view of that generic patent.
168. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a)(1) (7th
ed. 1998). See also id. § 2164.04 (describing the burden placed on the
examiner to establish a reason to question enablement).
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compounds is that it clearly defines the boundaries of the
169
claims.
If one claims all linear saturated alkanes, for
instance, one of ordinary skill in the chemical arts knows
170
For
whether or not a compound falls within that class.
DNAs, however, that purpose can be met without a precise
nucleotide sequence. Mammallian insulin cDNAs, for instance,
can be defined as cDNAs derived from a mammal that encode
insulin, with insulin being defined as a hormone that acts to
171
That description by
decrease glucose levels in the blood.
function clearly defines for one skilled in the art what cDNAs
172
fall within the class. Alternatively, the class could be defined
by a structural description, but one that falls short of an exact
nucleotide sequence for every member of the class. For
instance, it could be defined as cDNAs that encode a protein
that has an amino acid sequence at least 80% identical to the
amino acid sequence of rat insulin. That definition would
probably include every natural insulin cDNA, and no other
naturally occurring genes.
Thus, the purpose of clearly
defining the boundaries of the claims to recombinant DNA is
achievable without requiring an exact nucleotide specification
of every member of the class, or even any nucleotide sequence
information.
A second purpose of requiring a structural description for a
claim to an ordinary chemical or chemicals is that structure
gives a chemist skilled in the art good information about how to
synthesize the chemical. For DNA, however, while a complete

169. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568 (“In claims involving chemical
materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic
claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from
others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass.”).
170. A linear saturated alkane is a compound containing only carbon and
hydrogen, no branches on the chain, and no double or triple bonds. It has the
structure CH4, CH3-CH3, or CH3-(CH2)N-CH3, where N is any number from one
to infinity. See MOELLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 896-99.
171. See DARNELL ET AL., supra note 38, at 693-95.
172. The court in Eli Lilly & Co. held that with a functional description of
genes (what proteins they encode), “one skilled in the art therefore cannot, as
one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of
the members of the genus.” Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568. This is
incorrect. If one wishes to determine the function of a protein a gene
produces, one can isolate the protein and test it in biochemical assays to see,
for instance, if it acts like insulin. In the alternative, merely from the amino
acid sequence of a protein, which is known from the DNA sequence of the
gene, one could predict with a high degree of certainty that it performs the
same function as another protein if the two proteins have very closely related
sequences. See CREIGHTON supra note 99.
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structure would allow one to synthesize the DNA by the
polymerase chain reaction, the same purpose could be served
by, for instance, description of a process for isolating a cDNA
from a library based on knowledge of the amino acid sequence
of the protein it encodes. In that case, specification of the
nucleotide sequence is not necessary to enable preparation of
the DNA. Thus, the purpose can be served in other ways.
A third purpose in requiring a structural description of
chemicals is that their structure is assumed to be closely
related to their characteristics and functional properties. That
assumption is wrong when applied to DNA. The function of
DNA is to encode proteins and a single nucleotide change could
173
Conversely, many
abolish production of the protein.
nucleotides could be changed in a DNA while allowing it to still
174
encode exactly the same protein. Thus, this purpose is better
served by a functional, as opposed to a structural description.
D. FULFILLING THE PURPOSES OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
The purposes of the written description requirement can be
fulfilled without a requirement that a claim to recombinant
DNAs must be supported by listing a particular nucleotide
sequence. The purposes courts have asserted for the written
description requirement are: to prove that the inventor was in
possession of the invention on the filing date; to ensure that
new claims are adequately supported by an earlier filed
specification; and to guard against deception or “pretending
175
that an invention is more than what it really is.” The written
173. Codons are sequences of three nucleotides in the coding sequence of a
gene that encode an amino acid or other information for the synthesis of a
protein. See supra note 128. Most codons encode amino acids. But three
codons — TAA, TAG, and TGA — are stop codons. They direct that no amino
acid is to be inserted and synthesis of the protein is to stop at this point. See
WOOD, supra note 38, at 433-37. Thus, if CAA, for instance, encoding
glutamine, is found near the beginning of a gene, a single base change in that
trinucleotide codon, to TAA, would change the codon to a stop codon. The
result, although every other nucleotide in the gene remained the same, would
be that synthesis of the entire protein would be stopped at that point. Only a
greatly shortened, nonfunctional, version of the protein would be produced,
which would be quickly degraded in the cell.
174. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 128.
175. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); see also supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text.
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description requirement makes sense when an inventor
attempts to relate back claims to an earlier application,
because it may be that the earlier specification had enabled the
practice of the newly claimed invention, but at that time, the
inventor did not realize it. In that case, there may be policy
reasons for asserting that the technology has been surrendered
to the public, so that the inventor cannot reclaim exclusive
possession of it. Or there may be reasons for awarding priority
to an intervening claimant who first realized the presence of an
invention intrinsically present in the first specification, rather
than to the initial inventor. When we are looking at the
specification and claims in the same patent application,
however, it is difficult to see why the written description
requirement is needed in addition to the enablement
requirement. If the person is claiming the invention, and if his
specification enables its practice, then there is no question that
he is in possession of it. The enablement requirement is
sufficient to guard against deception and fraudulent claims of
inventorship, because enabling others to practice an invention
necessarily implies that the inventor also has the ability to
practice it. In addition, if the claim at issue is present in the
originally filed application, then there is no doubt the inventor
recognized the claimed invention by the time of filing.
E.

AVOIDING EASY CIRCUMVENTION OF PATENTS

Another consequence of the requirement that claimed DNA
be specified by nucleotide sequences is that it leads to easy
circumvention of patents. Taken literally, this requirement
means potential infringers could get around the claim by
changing one nucleotide in the DNA. It is possible to change a
large number of nucleotides in a DNA and have no effect on the
amino acid sequence of the protein it encodes. Thus, infringers
could change numerous nucleotides and still know that the
invention will function exactly as it functioned previously. In
Amgen, the claim drafters tried to encompass this obvious type
of circumvention within their claim, but the court invalidated
it. Amgen tried to claim other nucleotide sequences encoding
the same, or closely related, amino acid sequences. Amgen
claimed all DNA sequences “encoding a polypeptide having an
amino
acid
sequence
sufficiently
duplicative
of . . .
erythropoietin to allow possession of the biological property of
causing bone marrow cells to increase production of . . . red

154

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 2:121

176

blood cells . . . .”
The court invalidated this claim for lack of
177
an enabling disclosure. It would be obvious to one of ordinary
skill to mutate the claimed DNA in Amgen so as to make a
single amino acid change in the encoded EPO protein. One
would expect that the resultant protein would probably
function just as well as EPO, yet it would fall outside the literal
claims. It would be even more obvious to change the nucleotide
sequence in a way that does not change the amino acid
sequence of the encoded protein. Then it is certain that the
protein will function the same: it will be the same protein. The
inventors tried to draft their claims to encompass these obvious
ways to circumvent the claims, but the court rejected their
178
attempts. That is a bad result. Although the court made this
ruling based on a mistaken enablement analysis, the same
result would flow automatically from a rule that claimed DNAs
must be specified by their nucleotide sequences.
F.

PROMOTING EARLY DISCLOSURE

One of the main rationales of the patent system is
179
promoting disclosure of technical advances.
Evaluating

176. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1204 (describing the Amgen ‘008 patent,
claim 7).
177. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. At least the court was
looking at enablement rather than a blanket rule that the nucleotide sequence
of all claimed DNAs must be specified, but its ruling of lack of enablement
seems debatable. Methods of making mutations in DNAs (changing their
nucleotide sequences) are well known in the art. See J. SAMBROOK ET AL.,
MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL, Chapter 15 (2nd ed. 1989).
Likewise, it is well known in the art that a single amino acid change in a
protein will usually have little or no effect on the protein’s function. See
CREIGHTON supra note 99.
178. See Ex parte Dubbs, 119 U.S.P.Q. 440, 441 (Bd. App. 1958) (holding
that an applicant is entitled to claim variables of the invention in terms
sufficiently broad to afford protection of the invention against easy
circumvention).
179. See Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s
Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and
History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 20, 46 (Michael B. Wallerstein et al., eds., 1993)
(describing that in the patent system of medieval Venice, it was not even
essential that the applicant be the inventor). The important thing was that
the inventor disclosed a technology not present in Venice. See id. Patents
were a government grant of a temporary monopoly in exchange for importing
and disclosing a foreign technology. See id. The enablement requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, is really a requirement of full disclosure, requiring that
the invention be set out in “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
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patents through a fact-based enablement inquiry would
promote this goal. Rules stating that compositions of matter
may never be claimed by their function or method of isolation
thwart this goal. Once an inventor has determined the
function of a gene by isolating, characterizing, and determining
the amino acid sequence of a protein (which must be encoded by
some gene) the isolation of the corresponding gene is often
180
The quickest advancement of the
routine and obvious.
nation’s technical capacity occurs if inventors reveal their
discoveries at that time so that others can build upon it. But
under the Federal Circuit’s doctrine they may not file for a
patent on the gene at that time, because they do not know the
nucleotide sequence of the gene. They would be well advised to
withhold that information until they can complete the time
consuming yet routine steps of isolating the gene and
sequencing it. In Eli Lilly, for example, the inventors who
isolated the rat insulin cDNA should have withheld that
information from the public and used it secretly to complete the
relatively routine steps of cloning the human insulin cDNA,
which was the more economically valuable cDNA.
G. AVOIDING ECONOMIC WASTE
The current Federal Circuit requirements for patent claims
to recombinant DNA promote economic waste. If a group of
inventors publicly reveal discoveries which make it obvious
how to isolate a cDNA, as the inventors in Eli Lilly did, under
current doctrine others may race them to perform the isolation
181
It is
and file a patent application if they do so first.
economically wasteful to have multiple firms racing to
accomplish a routine step that is achievable in roughly the
same time by any one firm that attempted it. In contrast, if the
court eliminated the rules that DNAs may not be claimed by
their function or method of isolation, and just focused on
whether the specification enables one skilled in the art to
practice the invention without undue experimentation, the
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same. . . .” 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2001). The requirement that the inventor not have disclosed
his invention more than one year prior to filing also shows that the reason
patents are granted in the U.S. is to promote disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. § 102
(b) (2001). If the inventor has already disclosed (more than one year earlier),
he is not granted a patent. See id.
180. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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inventor who made the subsequent steps obvious could file for a
patent and avoid this waste.
H. WRITING LAWS THAT WILL NOT BE MADE OBSOLETE BY
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
Courts and legislatures should strive to write laws that
endure and are adaptable to changing times. Advancements in
technology should not render patent law doctrines obsolete.
182
Perhaps when the Federal Circuit first announced in Bell
that a prior art protein amino acid sequence did not make the
cDNA encoding it obvious, the court was correct in the sense
that at the time the experimentation was done in that case, it
was not routine enough to clone a cDNA from the knowledge of
the protein sequence.
Today, that procedure is clearly
183
The Federal Circuit’s invariant legal rule that DNA
routine.
182. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
183. The procedure has been widely used with few changes for the last 15
years. Amino acids are encoded by codons, a sequence of three nucleotides.
There is more than one codon for most amino acids, but in most cases only the
third nucleotide varies among them. Alanine, for instance, is encoded by four
codons, but all of them begin with GC. The third nucleotide in the sequence
could be any one of the four nucleotides — A, C, G, or T. A polypeptide having
the sequence Ala-Lys-His-Ala, would be encoded by a DNA with the sequence
GC(A,C,G,T)-AA(A,G)-CA(C,A)-GC(A,C,G,T), where the nucleotides in
parentheses indicate the possible third nucleotides of each codon. See W.B.
WOOD ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY: A PROBLEMS APPROACH 433-37 (2nd ed. 1981).
To find the DNA encoding the protein containing that stretch of four amino
acids, one would synthesize a DNA having the sequence indicated above. For
each position where the nucleotide is uncertain one would synthesize a
mixture of DNA containing all possible nucleotides in that position. Thus one
would synthesize a family of short pieces of DNA, and one member of the
family would correspond to the exact DNA sequence of the gene encoding this
protein. The mixture of short DNA is labeled with radioactivity or a
fluorescent label and then allowed to hybridize to the DNA contained in a
library of clones. The clone containing the DNA of interest is then identified
by the radioactive or fluorescent label attached to it. In practice, the short
DNAs used must contain at least 18 nucleotides, corresponding to a sequence
encoding at least six amino acids. If more amino acids are known, the DNA
can be made longer, producing more desirable results. See T. MANIATIS, ET
AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 224-28 (1982).
This procedure is described in a “recipe book” of standard molecular
biology procedures. See T. MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A
LABORATORY MANUAL (2nd ed. 1989). It was also described in that manual’s
first edition in 1982 and it has been used in identical form since at least that
time. The author has used the procedure to clone one gene and map two
others; thousands of genes have been cloned in the same manner.
The procedure is time consuming. It takes at least two or three weeks and
often a few months to clone a gene. There are many steps involved, and
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can never be claimed without specification of their nucleotide
sequence or that compositions of matter can never be claimed
by their function or method of isolation has been overtaken by
technology. It results in a bar to claiming DNA inventions
184
Legal rules should be crafted
until obvious steps are taken.
to be adaptable to advances in technology. The enablement
requirement, that the patent specification must enable one
skilled in the art to construct or perform the invention without
undue experimentation, is flexible and adaptable to changes in
technology. It is flexible because enablement is judged by the
standard of technology at the time of filing. It has been a
patent requirement since the first United State Patent Act of
185
It has been adaptable and useful in evaluating
1790.
patentability through more than 200 years of technological
advancement and it should be the central focus in evaluating
the validity of generic biotechnology patent claims. The
Federal Circuit’s new rules are inflexible and have already
been overtaken by technology. For these reasons, the Federal
Circuit should rescind them.

difficulties can arise at each step, particularly for the novice. But the
procedures involved at each step have been worked out and have been used for
years, and in the end success is virtually assured.
Is an undue amount of experimentation required to clone a gene from
knowledge of the corresponding protein sequence? Not by the standard
followed in Wands. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text. The
procedure is lengthy and time consuming, but so was the procedure for
isolating the monoclonal antibody at issue in Wands. See id. Success with the
procedure is virtually assured, as it was in In re Wands. See id. Difficulties
do arise in the procedure, but they did also arose in Wands. See id. In fact,
the Wands inventors failed in their first three attempts at isolating the
monoclonal antibody, until they gained the requisite experience of one of
ordinary skill in the art. See id. In biotechnology cases, a court has defined
one of ordinary skill in the art as a junior faculty member (presumably
possessing a doctorate degree in biochemistry or a related discipline) with one
or two years of relevant experience, or a postdoctoral student with several
years of experience. See Enzo Biochem., Inc., 188 F.3d at 1373. With that
level of skill, it is expected that one can carry out a lengthy but routine
procedure, and overcome the sorts of difficulties that are routinely overcome
by others of skill in the art. Thus, cloning a gene from the amino acid
sequence of the protein it encodes is obvious and does not require undue
experimentation.
184. See supra notes 48-56, 91-100, 182-83 and accompanying text.
185. See Donald S. Chisum, Comment: Anticipation, Enablement and
Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 15 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N. Q. J.
57, 59 (1987).
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USING BLOCKING PATENTS TO REWARD THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF ALL PARTIES

Granting a genus patent to an inventor who enables the
cloning and sequencing of a genus of genes does not necessarily
mean the contributions of others who later clone and sequence
particular species cannot also be rewarded with patents.
186
Cloning a gene and
Blocking patents accommodate this.
determining its nucleotide sequence requires a significant
amount of work — even if the protein encoded by the gene and
the amino acid sequence of the protein are known, or if a
homologous gene in a different species has been cloned and
187
Since cloning and sequencing genes does take a
sequenced.
significant amount of work, it behooves society to encourage it
by awarding patents. Furthermore, it is true that, as the
Federal Circuit has observed, the exact nucleotide sequence of
a gene is not obvious merely from the amino acid sequence of
188
For those reasons, the individual or
the protein it encodes.
group who clones and sequences a gene may deserve a patent
on that nucleotide sequence and its close homologs. That does
not mean, however, that the party who isolated the protein and
determined its amino acid sequence, or who cloned the same
gene in a different species, does not also deserve patent rights
over the genes whose isolation they enabled.
Both
contributions can be recognized by the patent system. Blocking
189
One who clones the rat
patents allow this arrangement.
insulin cDNA, for example, should be able to claim all
mammalian insulin cDNAs, since she has enabled their
isolation by methods that are obvious and routine to one of skill
in the art. The party that then clones and sequences the
human insulin cDNA perhaps should also have a patent on
recombinant DNAs comprising that particular nucleotide
sequence and its close homologs, since the particular nucleotide
sequence was nonobvious.
186. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
187. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63 (stating that while the patent
application claiming the rat prosinsulin cDNA was filed in May of 1977, the
application on the human proinsulin cDNA was not filed until September of
1979).
188. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
189. See In re Kaplan, 787 F.2d 1574, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that
an improvement is patentable if it meets the same three requirements for
patentability all inventions must meet — novelty, nonobviousness, and utility,
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, even if it falls within the scope of a previous patent).
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Both parties should be able to claim a range of nucleotide
sequence variations, since those variations would be obvious to
one of skill in the art and would not be expected to alter the
utility of the invention. However, if another party finds that
one of the obvious variations on the nucleotide sequence has
useful and unexpected properties, he can also get a patent on
190
Blocking patents are common in the patent
that sequence.
system allowing all interests to be accommodated, and are
appropriate under these circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit is apparently hesitant to uphold broad
patent rights in the new field of recombinant DNA. It is
probably concerned that it should not choke off development in
a new field of technology by granting excessively broad patent
rights. It does not want to reduce incentives for others to
continue to advance the field. That undoubtedly is a valid
concern. But the court has addressed the concern in the wrong
way. It has erected special barriers that make genus claims
not merely difficult, but virtually impossible. A better way to
address the concern would be to stringently examine
recombinant DNA patents with the enablement requirement.
That approach could still be used to strike down patents that
are broader than justified, but would not have the effect of
banning all genus claims in the field and would involve the use
of a requirement that is adaptable and need not be changed as
technology evolves.

190. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.02 (a) (7th ed.
1998) (establishing that an unexpected property is evidence which may rebut a
prima facie case of obviousness).

